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TORTS-EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-GEORGIA
CONTINUES TO CLING TO THE IMPACT RULE
In Strickland v. Hodges,I the Georgia Court of Appeals held that there
is no independent right of action in a parent for emotional harm suffered
upon witnessing the extent of the injury his child has sustained as a result
of a defendant's wilful and wanton negligence. 2 An eleven year old girl
suffered serious injuries arising out of a collision between the automobile
in which she was riding and an automobile negligently operated by the
defendant while admittedly under the influence of intoxicants. Although
the child's parents were not present at the time of the accident, they
became aware of their daughter's condition shortly afterwards.' Thereafter, the parents brought an independent action against the defendant
seeking recovery for emotional distress and mental suffering. In granting
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court struck
from a three-count complaint those two counts which sought damages
based upon great emotional distress.' Strickly adhering to Georgia's endorsement of the "impact rule," the court of appeals affirmed, rejecting
plaintiffs' contention that this doctrine should not be applied to such a
novel factual setting based on wilfulness and wantonness.'
The common law rule which is still in effect in Georgia and in a decreasing majority of jurisdictions7 is that there is no recovery for the negligent
infliction of mental distress unless accompanied by a contemporaneous
physical injury or impact or objective manifestation thereof.8 The general
1. 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975).
2. In Strickland, the court, quoting from plaintiff-appellant's first brief, page seven, was
careful in limiting the scope of the appeal to
when (1) such injury resulted from the wilful and wanton negligence of the defendant; (2) the parent was not a witness to the incident causing such injury; (3) the
parent was not nearby when the child was injured; (4) there was no impact to the
plaintiff [parent]; (5) the negligent acts of the defendant were "directed toward"
the child and not the plaintiff [parent] and (6) the parent learned of the injury a
short time afterward and then suffered emotional harm.
Id. at 909, 216 S.E.2d at 707.
3. While written for an unanimous court, Judge Clark's opinion lacks specificity as to the
particular time lapses between the accident, the parents' learning of their child's misfortune,
and the moment of visual confirmation.
4. A single count by the father for medicals and loss of services was not a concern of the
appeal.
5. See Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89
Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. 843, 32
S.E.2d 420 (1944).
6. Apparently, it was the degree of negligence involved that compelled the court to label
the appeal as a question of first impression.
7. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa.
Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961); Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W.Va. 340, 36
S.E.2d 475 (1945).
8.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) §436A (1965).
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consideration underlying this treatment of mental distress in terms of
parasitic' damages is to guarantee that the mental disturbance is genuine,
thereby precluding fraudulent claims. It must be noted that in those jurisdictions which follow the "impact rule," the doctrine is generally applied
only in cases involving ordinary negligence; however, where the wrongful
act is wilful or wanton, it is practically the unanimous view that a defendant is liable for serious emotional distress regardless of the element of
impact.' 0
The holding in Southern Ry. v. Jackson ' is indicative of the diminishing
majority view that there can be no recovery for mental trauma suffered as
a result of observing the injury sustained by a third person, where the
mental trauma is unaccompanied by physical impact of injury. Bypassing
the impact requirement, other jurisdictions have extended the right of
recovery for such damages where the defendant's negligent act threatened
the plaintiff himself with possible harm or placed him within what has
been called the "zone of danger.' 2 Moreover, precedent now exists for the
allowance of recovery for emotional harm suffered by one who is not within
the "zone of danger." Thus, in the landmark case of Dillon v. Legg, 3 the
Supreme Court of California granted recovery to a mother standing outside
the "zone of danger" who witnessed the death of her child in an automobile
accident. As was to be expected, the California courts quickly extended the
rationale of Dillon to encompass a parent who had not actually witnessed
her child's misfortune but came upon the scene moments after the negli4
gent act.
Certain jurisdictions have begun to follow the lead of the California
courts in expanding the right of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. In upholding a judgment for a homeowner who suffered mental
anguish from negligently induced flood damage, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii succinctly concluded in Rodriquez v. State5 that there is "a duty
to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress.""' The
9. The parasitic tort theory emerged as one of the earliest theories under which mental
or emotional harm could form the basis for a cause of action for damages. According to this
theory, any existing tort, no matter how technical, could be used as the peg upon which to
hang the mental damages, thus creating a cause of action for such parasitic damages. See,
e.g., Prosser, IntentionalInfliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 874,
880 (1939).
10. See 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance §14 (1968) and cases cited
therein.
11. 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916).
12. See Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). See also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS (SECOND) §313, comment "d" at 114 (1965).
13. 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
14. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App.2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). In Archibald,
the California Court of Appeals stated that "the shock of seeing a child severly injured
immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as that experienced in witnessing the accident itself." Id. at __,
79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
15. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
16. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. Compare Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. 18, 501 P.2d
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same court, in the more recent case of Leong v. Takasaki," held that in
connection with such a duty,'" relief for a plaintiff exists even in the absence of both physical impact and a blood relationship between the victim
and the plaintiff. Thus, in each case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii adhered to the general tort law principles that, where the plaintiff suffers
mental distress as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's
negligent act, the defendant is liable thereby. As the Hawaii decisions have
demonstrated, the apparent trend is toward a gradual abandonment of the
various artificial restrictions to recovery in favor of general tort law principles."
As early as 189220 the Supreme Court of Georgia propounded the "impact
rule" as requisite to a recovery for mental injury. Subsequently, in Christy
Bros. Circus v. Turnage,2 ' the doctrine was extended so as to include even
the slightest touch of impact. Nevertheless, the Georgia courts have also
been continuously supportive of an old common law exception to the requirment of impact. This exception was well stated in Dunn v. Western
Union Telegraph Company:"
While mental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to purse or person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon wrongful acts merely negligent, yet such damages may be recovered in those cases where the plaintiff
has suffered at the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the natural result
of which is the causation of mental suffer2
ing and wounded feelings.
Similarly, this exception to the "impact rule" has provided the basis for a
plaintiffs recovery for mental distress where "the action was not for a mere
2' 4
negligent tort, but was for a positive and wilful wrong.
The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions recognizes an inde368 (1972), which allowed recovery for emotional distress and disappointment where a contract was broken in a wanton and reckless manner.
17. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
18. In Leong, the court specifically defined duty as "a legal conclusion dependent upon
the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id. at -, 520 P.2d at 764.
19. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, , 520 P.2d 758, 762-64 (1974) for a survey of
cases from other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of California had previously declared in
Dillon that:
[Tihe problem should be solved by the application of principles of tort, not by the
creation of exceptions to them. Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not
withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion.
68 Cal.2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
20. Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901 (1892).
21. 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (horse evacuated bowels into plaintiff's lap).
22. 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907) (abusive language).
23. Id. at 846, 59 S.E. at 189.
24. Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 780, 171 S.E. 470, 472 (1933) (drunken
conduct by bill collector in efforts to collect a bill from plaintiff).
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pendent right of action for severe emotional distress regardless of impact,
where such injuries are sustained as a result of the defendant's intentional
or wanton conduct being directed at a third person.25 Although the Second
Restatement of Torts appears to limit a defendant's liability to those cases
in which the plaintiff is present at the time the intentional or reckless
misconduct occurs,2" the caveat provided therein "is intended to however,
leave open the possibility of situations in which presence at the time may
not be required."2 Whereas, Georgia decisions have granted relief for mental suffering without physical impact in circumstances where the wilful act
was directed towards the plaintiff, 8 the courts have tenaciously denied
those independent claims where such wanton behavior is directed against
some third party."
In holding that parents have no right to recover damages for emotional
harm suffered after witnessing the extent of their child's wilfully and wantonly 0 inflicted injuries, the Strickland court relied most heavily on the
3
illustrious New York decision of Tobin v. Grossman'.
Impressed by the
pragmatism supportive of the reasoning in that opinion, the court of appeals ardently endorsed the public policy of limiting the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree, thereby eliminating the possible proliferation of claims. The court in Strickland noted that, whereas
Tobin involved only ordinary negligence, the New York court's logic in
refusing to extend liability to parent absentee situations was equally appl25. See 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance §38 (1968) and cases cited
therein.
26. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SEcOND) §46 (1965). This section provides that:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. (2)
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of
such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such
distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time,
if such distress results in bodily harm.
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) §46, comment "1" at 79 (1965).
28. See Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948); Dunn v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907).
29. See Towler v. Jackson, 111 Ga. App. 8, 140 S.E.2d 295 (1965); Hamby v. Edmunds
Motor Co., 80 Ga. App.'209, 55 S.E.2d 743 (1949); Pettett v. Thompson, 33 Ga. App. 240,
125 S.E. 779 (1924); Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914). But see Pollard
v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102 (1937), which holds that a cause of action for great
mental pain and suffering exists for a widow where the defendant wilfully and wantonly
mutilates the corpse of her deceased husband. The court of appeals apparently reasoned that
the negligence was directed towards the widow with a reckless disregard of her rights to the
body.
30. See Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 217 Ga. 438, 123 S.E.2d 261 (1961), which
holds that a motorist's reckless and wanton disregard of the consequences, evincing willingness to inflict injury or produce death, may amount to wilfulness, though there is no direct
proof of actual intention to inflict injury or produce death.
31. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
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icable to a case involving wilful and wanton negligence.2 Thus, the court,
without any apparent explanation, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
a situation involving a most serious degree of negligence should not necessarily be governed by those Georgia precedents which apply the "impact
rule" to cases based upon mere negligence. Although stating at the outset
of its opinion that the appeal presented a question of first impression,33 the
Strickland court obviously refused to consider the case as anomalous. This
3
may have been due to the fact that the California and Hawaii decisions 1
which plaintiffs cited as supportive of their proposal, did not involve the
elements of wilfulness and wantonness. Nonetheless, the court in
Strickland promptly disposed of plaintiffs' California barrage as being
based upon both the "zone of danger" and "fear for another",, doctrines,
and therefore inapplicable since the Georgia authorities espouse the more
stringent "impact rule." 8 Likewise, the court found the Hawaii holdings
unpersuasive, for they too gave application to the "zone of danger" and
foreseeability tests." Furthermore, the Strickland court pointed out that
a more recent Hawaii decision 38 reiterates the public policy argument previously voiced in Tobin."
Apart from the strong policy arguments against recovery, the court,
holding firmly to a line of local precedents, flatly refused to extend the
common law exception to the "impact rule" so as to provide an independent right of action where a defendant's wilful act is directed towards a
third person.40 In short, the court in Strickland held that where the wilful
and wanton conduct is not directed towards the complainant, the impact
requirement must still be satisfied. Finding no such satisfaction as to
32. 134 Ga. App. at 913, 216 S.E.2d at 709.
33. Id. at 909, 216 S.E.2d at 707.
34. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Archibald v.
Braverman, 275 Cal. App.2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398,
520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
35. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), which is commonly
regarded as the leading decision. Accord, Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952);
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950).
36. 134 Ga. App. at 910-11, 216 S.E.2d at 707-08.
37. Id. at 911, 216 S.E.2d at 708.
38. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., - Haw. , 532 P.2d 673 (1975). In Kelley,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii concluded that it was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence
that a person in California would die of a heart attack upon being informed of a family
member's death from an automobile accident which occurred in Hawaii.
39. In Strickland, the Georgia Court of Appeals quoted with approval the following popular language:
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant
who has endangered one man were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings
of every other person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked
at an accident, and every distant relative of the person injured, as well as his
friends.
134 Ga. App. at 911, 216 S.E.2d at 708 quoting from W. PROssER, LAW Op ToRTS
§54 at 334 (4th ed. 1971).
40. Id. at 912-13, 216 S.E.2d at 709.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

physical impact,4 ' the court thus denied the injured child's parents their
right of action for emotional distress and mental suffering. As an apparent
afterthought, obviously made for consolation, the Strickland court recalled
that "the overwhelming factor is that our law already gives the injured
child her right to damages for her injuries, including punitive damages,
and gives the father the right to recover medical expenses and loss of
services.""
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Strickland v. Hodges failed to take the
initiative in abolishing Georgia's continuing parasitic approach to the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Whereas, the growing trend
among the various jurisdictions is a departure from the artificial guidelines
to recovery, 3 the Georgia courts have devotedly sanctioned application of
the "impact rule." Thus, the Strickland court rehashed the illogical view
that there should be at least some physical impact in order to guarantee
the reality of the cause of the injuries suffered. If the negligence of the
defendant is such that it would naturally cause severe emotional injury,
the absence of physical contact should have little or no weight when determining the sufficiency of a claim. From the viewpoint of analogy, certainly,
such claims are no more likely to be false than claims for damages for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress, already recognized in this state."
Moreover, it may not be said with any reasonable measure of certainty how
often fraudulent claims would be presented. Therefore, it seems that public policy should not require that all honest claims be barred merely because, otherwise, some dishonest ones might prevail. The better view
would be to allow an independent cause of action for mental distress and
emotional harm with recovery based on the facts and proof of each particular case. To allow this independent cause of action without requiring the
cause to be tacked on to some other recognized and existing claim, would
be a step toward making the law answerable to wrongs that should not go
unrighted.' 5 As one author so aptly expressed nearly seventy years ago:
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today
41. The criteria for establishing impact that the court alluded to is set forth in Southern
Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916).
42. 134 Ga. App. at 913, 216 S.E.2d at 709.
43. See text accompanying notes 7 and 19, supra.
44. Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907). See also Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921).
45. Note, Torts-Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury,
76 W. VA. L. REV. 176 (1973). See also Prosser, IntentionalInfliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 874, 892 (1939):
All of these problems could be dealt with in far more intelligent fashion if we were
to jettison the entire cargo of technical torts with which the real cause of action has
been burdened, and recognized it as standing on its own feet. There is every indication that this will henceforth be done, and that the intentional infliction of extreme
mental suffering by outrageous conduct will be treated as a separate and independent tort.
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recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social, economic, and
industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law."6
WALLACE MILLER

46.

1 T. STREET, THE

FOUNDATION Op LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
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